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Introduction
An important enterprise in recent literature on normativity is the Reasons First Project
(RFP), which seeks to analyze all normativity in terms of reasons. The Domain of Rea-
sons is the most ambitious and penetrating defense of RFP to date, and should be its
locus classicus for years to come. The book is an equally monumental contribution to
the broader metaphysics and epistemology of the normative, defending a novel “cogni-
tive irrealist” outlook that provides a compelling rival to outlooks in similarly bold books,
such as Parfit (2011). The book’s reach extends much farther: it examines topics of im-
mediate interest to metaphysicians and philosophers of language and mind like modality,
analyticity, rule-following, and concepts, and makes important contributions to first-order
ethics and epistemology. And despite its tremendous size, the work hangs together beau-
tifully, thanks in part to a historical narrative that connects and compares its undertaking
to Kant’s Critical project and logical positivism.
The book divides into four parts, the first three developing Skorupski’s version of RFP
and the last expounding his cognitive irrealism. Part I mainly lays down the conceptual
groundwork, discussing the general properties and logic of the three reason-relations he
takes as primitive (epistemic, practical, and evaluative), the distinction between neutral
and relative reasons, the general framework for analyzing normativity in terms of reasons,
and the nature of reasons we possess (“warranted reasons”) and of correctly responding to
reasons (“acting from reasons”). Part II is nominally about epistemic reasons, but half of
it concerns topics usually treated by metaphysicians and philosophers of language—viz.,
modality and analyticity. The rationale is that according to Skorupski, modality is itself
a normative notion analyzable in terms of epistemic reasons, and pace the positivists,
analyticity will do little to illuminate the a priori. The other two chapters in Part II directly
concern the epistemology of the a priori and a posteriori, with the first setting the stage
for a later discussion of the epistemology of normativity. Part III turns to evaluative and
practical reasons, focusing in large part on concepts of morality and prudence. Part IV
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develops Skorupski’s take on the metaphysics and epistemology of the normative, but also
discusses rule-following, concept possession, and self-determination.
In this critical study, I’ll focus on aspects of the book that intersect with epistemology
and philosophy of mind. These aspects have received less attention than they deserve. Re-
flection on them reveals, I will argue, a tension in Skorupski’s meta-normative outlook:
we ought, I believe, either to resist his spontaneity-based epistemology of normativity
or abandon the cognition-independence of normativity and accept constructivism (which
Skorupski resists but doesn’t sufficiently address in its best, Kantian form). After dis-
cussing this tension in §1, I turn in §2 to consider one rationale for adopting a spontaneity-
based epistemology of the normative—viz., that the “receptive” intuitionist alternative is
unacceptable. I argue that this rationale is unconvincing, since there is a better intuition-
based epistemology that isn’t touched by Skorupski’s case against “intuitionism”; notably,
this epistemology is neither receptive in Skorupski’s sense nor spontaneity-based. If we
want to maintain a cognition-independent view of normative truth, we would do better to
adopt this epistemology. I proceed in §3 to suggest that the intuitions that support the con-
straint on reasons Skorupski calls “cognitive internalism” and his claims about the range
of reasons might recommend a fully Kantian meta-normative package. Nonetheless, I
raise some worries about the reliability of these intuitions, worries echoed by ones I raise
in §4 about Skorupski’s discussion of epistemic reasons in Part I. I conclude, however, by
recommending that he opt for the fully Kantian package.
1 Spontaneity and Cognition-Independence: A Tension
Skorupski’s outlook is Kantian in one way and un-Kantian in another. On the one hand,
his epistemology of the normative crucially invokes the notion of spontaneity, with Sko-
rupski going so far as to claim that “[s]pontaneity is the sole final source of normative
knowledge” (414). On the other hand, he denies that normative truths are “cognition-
dependent” or more broadly mind-dependent, and in this way departs from Kant’s line
of resistance to “global realism”. Although Skorupski calls his outlook irrealist, this is
not because he accepts the constructivism favored by other Kantians (e.g., Korsgaard and
Markovits). It is rather because for Skorupski, Reality is the realm of substantial facts,
which by stipulation belong to the causal order, and normative facts are not in this sense
substantial. Normative facts are rather nominal facts—i.e., normative propositions that are
true in the minimalist way—though these facts are, Skorupski agrees with non-naturalist
realists like Parfit, irreducibly normative.
While Skorupski helpfully illuminates the elusive notion of spontaneity on pp.406–410,
I am left with questions about its epistemic role. I have two related worries, which lead
to a dilemma. Firstly, I do not understand how spontaneity could be a reliable guide to
truths about reason-relations unless one accepts a cognition-dependent, constructivist ac-
count of them. And if spontaneity isn’t a reliable guide to normative truth but merely a
source of internalist justification for normative propositions, I cannot see how it helps us
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to understand knowledge of normative truths. Although Skorupski’s account of epistemic
warrant isn’t couched in terms of reliability, he doesn’t deny that reliability is necessary
for normative knowledge; indeed, it is explicitly part of his view about a priori knowledge
in general on p.161, and concerning the special case of normative knowledge on p.162 he
just says that the way in which reliability is secured isn’t via a receptive faculty.
To avoid this worry, Skorupski could stipulate that spontaneity is itself to be under-
stood in terms of responsiveness to cognition-independent normative reasons. But then
I worry that so understood, spontaneity cannot play a fundamental role that would dis-
tinguish his picture from pictures held by non-naturalist realists like Parfit and earn it
the Kantian framing it receives. After all, one plausibly cannot respond to a normative
reason without having access to that normative reason as such, and this kind of access
is itself plausibly understood partly in terms of normative knowledge. Accordingly, if
spontaneity is grounded in reasons-responsiveness, normative knowledge cannot itself be
grounded in spontaneity on pain of circularity or regress. Spontaneity must, it seems,
explain reasons-responsiveness rather than be explained by it if it is to play a fundamen-
tal epistemic role—but that way leads to constructivism. Hence the dilemma: either go
constructivist or deny spontaneity a fundamental epistemic role.
One is reminded of McDowell (1995), who worried that an epistemology based solely
on spontaneity would lead to “frictionless spinning in the void”. Of course, if truths about
reasons are not “substantial”, we do not literally want friction. But we also do not want
spinning in the void. And why would beliefs about reasons that are “really mine” and
“reflective of my true nature”—phrases Skorupski treats as synonymous with “sponta-
neous”—have a better shot at the mark of normative truth if truths about reasons are not
themselves derivable from constitutive principles of self-determination or autonomy, as
Kantian constructivists suggest?
I see no answer. This is not to deny any epistemological significance to spontaneity.
Skorupski is perhaps right that explanations that “subvert or explain away the spontane-
ity of a response. . . also remove its epistemic value” (409). But insofar as this claim is
plausible, it is because “‘spontaneous’ contrasts with ‘factitious’”, where a “factitious as
against a truly spontaneous response or disposition is one that is accepted uncritically
into one’s thinking from others” (406). “Uncritical thinking” in one sense of the phrase
is unreliable, and so evidence that a response was factitious will be an undercutting de-
feater. So, if non-spontaneity implies factitiousness, non-spontaneity implies (or at least
probabilifies) unreliability. But it doesn’t follow that spontaneity is sufficient for reliabil-
ity. What follows is that spontaneity is necessary for reliability, assuming—and here one
worries about the stipulative nature of “spontaneity”—that non-spontaneity implies facti-
tiousness. I don’t see how a sufficiency claim would be plausible without constructivism.
Now, there is surprisingly little discussion of constructivism in the book, given the
putative origins of one of its most prominent versions—viz., the Kantian constructivism
of Korsgaard and Markovits.1 Skorupski rejects constructivism on p.429, but there he
1Skorupski denies on pp.11–12 and again on pp.484–487 that Kant was a constructivist about practical
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treats it as of a piece with fictionalism, which is not how Kantian constructivists intend
it. Skorupski seems in places not far from Kantian constructivism, writing, for example,
that “[r]eason relations. . . are irreal because they are objects not of imagination but of
pure cognition. A priori truths about them are cognition’s norms” (429). If one added
the word “constitutive” between “cognition’s” and “norms”, one would have a Kantian
constructivist proposal. One wonders, then, why Skorupski doesn’t consider this familiar
line. It could help to vindicate the role of spontaneity.
Moreover, unless given constructivist mooring, Skorupski’s metaphysical outlook is
dangerously close to that of his non-naturalist realist opponents. Parfit, for example,
agrees that normative facts are not substantial in Skorupski’s sense. In Parfit (2011), he
accepts “Non-Metaphysical Cognitivism”, and his gloss sounds a lot like cognitivist ir-
realism: “There are some claims that are irreducibly normative in the reason-involving
sense, and are in the strongest sense true. But these truths have no ontological implica-
tions. For such claims to be true, these reason-involving properties need not exist either as
natural properties in the spatio-temporal world, or in some non-spatio-temporal part of re-
ality” (Parfit 2011, Volume 2: 486). Since Skorupski accepts the cognition-independence
and irreducibility of these truths, it is hard to see why his view is less mysterious than
Parfit’s. It is not less mysterious just because Skorupski labels his view “irrealist”. Of
course, perhaps it is wrong to see either view as mysterious. But if so, how has Skorupski
made an advance over his non-naturalist realist opponents? Given Skorupski’s inspira-
tion, one would like to hear why he doesn’t distinguish himself from Parfit by following
constitutivist Kantians and making more of the claim that reason-relations are objects of
pure cognition, and truths about them cognition’s (constitutive) norms.
While Skorupski denies that this view is Kant’s, he happily departs from Kant else-
where. And other theses Skorupski considers attractive could push us from what he de-
scribes as Kant’s view to the constitutivism of some Kantians. Skorupski ascribes to
Kant the “Insight principle” that “no moral law applies to us whose validity we cannot
recognize for ourselves”, and in this way agrees that for Kant, our nature “‘constructs’
our experience of the moral law as law—as imperatival, binding—in somewhat the way
that it constructs our experience of things in themselves as objects in a causally inte-
grated spatio-temporal field” (486). Constitutivism about the moral law explains why
this principle is true, and constitutivism about reason-relations would provide a similar
grounding for the broader constraint on reasons Skorupski dubs “cognitive internalism”
(p.73), which is just the Insight principle writ large. While Skorupski notes on p.487 that
we will be stuck with subjectivism if we hold that we decide what our moral obligations
are, constitutivists don’t hold that view. We do not decide what the constitutive principles
of autonomous agency are. So constitutivism doesn’t face the concerns Skorupski raises.
While constitutivism faces other problems, it is worth considering to eliminate the
tension between Skorupski’s epistemology and metaphysics. The tension is vivid when
Skorupski is explaining why he doesn’t follow constructivists: “We must remember. . . the
normativity, however, so this fact may explain why he doesn’t feel pressure to discuss Korsgaard.
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distinction between holding that practical principles have their epistemic basis in disposi-
tions of the will (as argued in Chapter 16) and holding that they simply are the content of
actual acts of will” (487). Epistemology is beholden to truth. While we should deny that
practical principles are the content of actual acts of will, we need some deep link between
the will and truths about reasons if Skorupski’s epistemology is to work. Constitutivism
provides that link and is not the simple view rejected at the end of the quote.
2 Spontaneity by Elimination?
The aim of the last section was not to undermine a spontaneity-based epistemology of
normativity but to question its consistency with other parts of Skorupski’s outlook. I now
turn to consider whether Skorupski gives us sufficient reason to pursue a spontaneity-
based epistemology of normativity.
Skorupski’s initial path to this view is negative. In Part II, he attacks two models of
apriority he labels “intuitionism” and the “no-content view”. Intuitionism for Skorupski
holds that “a priori truths state substantial facts, and that we know these facts obtain by a
receptive faculty of intuition” (138). Intuitionism so defined is in stark contrast with his
own view, on which a priori truths state nominal facts that are no part of the causal order,
and our knowledge of which is “based on pure spontaneity” (139). While I agree that we
should reject intuitionism as Skorupski defines it, there is a better view deserving of the
label that lies in between this view and his. And if we want to preserve the cognition-
independence of normativity, we ought to prefer this view.
As a warm-up, note that no popular general accounts of knowledge today are essen-
tially “receptive” in Skorupski’s sense. A receptive theory of knowledge in this sense
would be a causal theory of knowledge along the lines of Goldman (1967), which re-
quires an appropriate causal connection running from the fact that p to one’s belief that
p. Such theories are unpopular in contemporary epistemology; Goldman himself swiftly
abandoned this view. While there are popular theories with causal elements, these ele-
ments do not involve essential appeal to a causal connection running from the fact that p to
one’s belief that p, which is the kind of causal connection most worth calling “receptive”.
Consider, for example, Sosa (2007a)’s account of knowledge as apt belief. S aptly
believes iff the correctness of S’s belief manifests some cognitive competence. While
the notion of manifestation is plausibly causal,2 it doesn’t follow that on this account the
fact that p must itself cause S’s belief that p. Rather, the correctness of S’s belief must
owe in the right way to cognitive competence. The explanatory relation here runs from
the competence to the correctness of the belief, not from the belief’s truth-maker to the
belief. There is no reason why this account of knowledge cannot apply to the a priori
even if a priori truths state merely nominal facts. It is compatible with an irrealist (in
Skorupski’s sense) and indeed constructivist metaphysics of the normative. Perhaps some
2Though Sosa (2015) takes the notion as primitive and rejects any simple causal analysis.
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epistemic competences (e.g., perceptual ones) are ones whose apt manifestation requires
a Goldman-circa-‘67 causal link. But then receptivity merely emerges as a local feature
of the epistemology of certain domains.
Observe now that not all epistemologies of the a priori that appeal to intuition un-
derstand intuition as a receptive faculty. Sosa is again exemplary. Sosa (2007a, 2007b)
defends the use of intuitions, but he is a reductionist about intuitions, viewing them as
epistemically evaluable “attractions to assent” to propositions exerted by the sheer under-
standing of them (where the subject matter is modally strong). Intuition is not a sui generis
receptive faculty for Sosa; indeed, intuitions for him are epistemically evaluable propo-
sitional attitudes. According to Sosa, these can play an epistemic role provided that they
manifest a “competence...on the part of S to discriminate the true from the false reliably
(enough) in some subfield of modally strong propositional contents that S understands
well enough, with no reliance on introspection, perception, memory, testimony, or infer-
ence” (2007a: 60). Skorupski cannot complain that the appeal to reliability implicates
receptivity, since he himself appeals to reliability in his account of a priori knowledge on
p.161. And since a priori truths are mind-independent on his view (just non-factual), he
fares no better in explaining reliability.
This view is compatible with a wide range of metaphysical views. While it is consis-
tent with non-naturalist realism, it is also consistent with views that are cognitivist and
irrealist in Skorupski’s sense, like the many varieties of constructivism and Skorupski’s
own view. One could develop a variant of Skorupski’s epistemology that is a version of
this view, on which a priori knowledge is knowledge grounded in spontaneous attractions
to assent that manifest reasons-sensitive competences. These attractions are also reliable
guides to synthetic a priori truths thanks to the fact that all synthetic a priori truths are
either reason-involving truths or “spinoffs” of them, as Skorupski suggests in Chapter 8.
I am, however, unsure that we should build the idea that all synthetic a priori truths are
either normative truths or “spinoffs” of them into our epistemology. Skorupski’s spinoff
story seems defensible for simple synthetic a priori truths like the truth that no object
can be red and green all over. Perhaps this truth is a priori because it is knowable by
suppositional reasoning about arbitrary objects using the norm (N) on p.155. But there
are hairier synthetic a priori truths, like significant philosophical truths. One would like
to hear about Skorupski’s philosophy of philosophy, since it is not clear that his story in
Chapter 8 plausibly generalizes. Perhaps it does, but without seeing the details I would,
other things being equal, prefer a simpler epistemology along the lines of Sosa’s.
If we opt for that simpler epistemology, we can hold onto the cognition-independence
of normativity. But if we accept this package of views, the result is not a distinctive meta-
normative package that can claim a Kantian heritage. The meta-normative package will
rather be close to Parfit’s, as long as we notice that Parfit, like Skorupski, also denies that
cognition-independent normative truth requires backing by a spooky ontology.
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3 Cognitive Internalism and the Range of Reasons
There are other reasons for preferring the Kantian package than that only it can provide
a credible epistemology of normativity. A further reason emerges from reflection on
Skorupski’s discussion of what determines the “range” of a reason (i.e., the set of actors
to whom it applies) and cognitive internalism. If this reason is good, however, it should
lead us to accept a full-blown Kantian constructivism, not Skorupski’s midway position.
In Chapter 3, Skorupski considers three possible constraints on the range of reasons:
the actors over whom a reason ranges must be ones (i) who can entertain the thought that
the relevant, reason-giving fact obtains, (ii) who can entertain the content of the act for
which the fact is a reason, or (iii) who can recognize de se that the fact is a reason for the
act. Of these three, Skorupski regards (iii) as the most plausible, though he is uncertain
about whether we should accept the cognitive internalism about reasons that (iii) induces.
But if cognitive internalism is true, it may provide an abductive argument for Kantian
constructivism. Plausibly, Kantian constructivism explains why (iii) is a constraint on
reasons, because it holds that to be a reason just is to be a consideration that any rational
agent could recognize as such in virtue of her constitution as a rational agent. And I see
no clear reason to expect cognitive internalism to be a constraint on reasons if we accept
a cognition-independent picture of reasons. If Kantian constructivism is also the most
extensionally adequate version of constructivism (which is, I think, not implausible), then
if we accept cognitive internalism we should accept it.
Now, matters are not quite so simple. For there are less intellectually demanding con-
straints than (iii) that allow us to bring more agents within the range of a reason that Sko-
rupski didn’t consider. Even beings who lack the sophisticated concept of a reason might
be able to treat certain facts as reasons of certain kinds, by being competently disposed to
respond in the ways that would be supported if these facts were reasons of these kinds.3
One might instead suggest that an agent is in the range of a reason only if s/he can (a)
treat the fact that gives this reason like the reason it is and (b) do so as a manifestation of a
competence to treat reason-giving facts like the reasons they are. Call satisfaction of this
constraint potential reason-sensitivity. Recognition of normative truths plausibly requires
potential reason-sensitivity, but potential reason-sensitivity is, one might reasonably hold,
a more primitive achievement. Reason-sensitivity could also ground a less intellectually
demanding account of warranted reasons and the notions Skorupski wants to analyze in
terms of them—viz., autonomy and self-determination. Skorupski’s account of warrant
is highly demanding. While he claims that it is stipulative and is happy to grant that we
are “readier to impute reasons than to impute the concept of a reason” (59), I would still
prefer to exploit weaker notions. If so, however, we probably shouldn’t go looking for a
Kantian explanation of constraints on the range of reasons.
These points bear on the moral Skorupski draws from his insightful discussion of
Williams’s internalism in Part III, where he suggests that Williams’s best argument rests
3For more on this idea, see Sylvan (2015).
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on cognitive internalism. The idea is that Williams’s “requirement of effectiveness” (i.e.,
that A has a reason to φ only if it is possible for A to φ for that reason) entails cogni-
tive internalism. I think this is false for the same reasons why I suggested (iii) was too
strong. The requirement of effectiveness only implies cognitive internalism if we think
that acting for a normative reason requires recognizing de dicto that this fact is a norma-
tive reason. This is an overintellectualization. Nonetheless, it is plausible that acting for
a normative reason requires manifesting a competence to treat particular reasons like the
reasons they are, where treating something as a reason doesn’t require having the concept
of a normative reason. Granting the requirement of effectiveness, the upshot is no less in-
teresting than cognitive internalism: something is a reason for A only if A has the ability
to correctly respond to this reason.
But at this point, some further discussion of the distinction between normative reasons
we have (“subjective normative reasons”) and normative reasons there are (“objective nor-
mative reasons”) would be in order. One could view cognitive internalism or my weaker
spinoff of it merely as a constraint on subjective normative reasons. It would only imply
interesting conclusions about objective reasons on the assumption that these are neces-
sarily “possessable”—i.e., only if the agents for whom they are objective reasons could
have them as subjective reasons. That assumption is more fundamental than cognitive
internalism or my spinoff of it. It should be addressed in its own right.
Related thoughts led me to wonder why we should buy Skorupski’s claims about the
connection between wrongness and blame and his epistemic condition on wrongness in
Part III. Skorupski claims that “[m]oral wrongness turns neither on the agent’s actual
beliefs, nor on the facts, but on the beliefs warranted in the agent’s epistemic state” (297).
But one could draw the subjective/objective distinction for wrongness and hold that this
claim is true only of subjective wrongness, which is what goes with blameworthiness. One
would then need further assumptions to recommend any cognitive internalist constraint
on wrongness period (such as p.302’s “Insight principle”), which Skorupski entertains in
§12.4–5 and again in §15.9. There may be an argument for these further assumptions, but
I suspect it would conflict with Skorupski’s desire to preserve cognition-independence.
4 Epistemic Reasons and the Unity of Normativity
The foregoing remarks bring me to a final set of comments. Epistemic reasons, we are
told in Part I, have a “special feature” in that they exhibit a “dependence on the actor’s
actual and possible knowledge”; if this weren’t so, Skorupski worries, “what gives me
reason to believe that p obtains could just be that fact, the fact that p, unrestrictedly for
any fact at all” (41–2). But I do not see sufficient reason for special treatment. Following
Skorupski himself in Chapter 5, we could distinguish between subjective and objective
reasons and maintain that only subjective epistemic reasons exhibit the relevant feature.
We could then note that they are no different from other subjective reasons in this way.
While epistemologists focus on subjective reasons, there seems to be a clear notion of an
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epistemic reason that isn’t relativized to any particular person’s actual or possible knowl-
edge. Given this notion, we could maintain that any fact that p is indeed an objective
reason to believe that p, but it can only be possessed as a (non-inferential) reason to
believe that p by people with certain cognitive abilities.4
Skorupski may be resistant because he is keen on pp.47–8 to distinguish epistemic
reasons and indicators. Indicative evidence, after all, would provide the clearest example
of an objective epistemic reason independent of anyone’s actual or possible knowledge.
But that thought aside, there is no obvious disanalogy between the epistemic case and the
practical/evaluative case. Hence, the desire for unity inclines me to query Skorupski’s
case for thinking that objective reasons for belief aren’t just indicators.
Skorupski postpones this case to Chapter 9. The argument I see there, however, sim-
ply recommends a different route to treating epistemic and other reasons alike. There
Skorupski suggests that indicative evidence is “relative to our receptive powers”, since
(e.g.) a “sound that dogs can hear but we can’t isn’t evidence for us” (213). He concludes
that bits of indicative evidence are indeed relative to certain possible epistemic fields. To
the extent that I find the driving intuition compelling, I suspect there is a more general in-
principle accessibility principle steering my intuitions that both explains this restriction
on indicative evidence and the intuition motivating cognitive internalism. If so, we still
get parity because epistemic and practical/evaluative reasons are all relative to possible
epistemic fields for an overarching reason (e.g., my spinoff of cognitive internalism).
This is one way in which Skorupski’s view could be more unified. There is an-
other way. In Chapter 2, Skorupski maintains that there is an irreducible trichotomy
of reason-relations—viz., epistemic, practical, and evaluative. Skorupski mentions two
views—epistemicism and pragmatism—on which there is just one basic reason-relation.
I would follow Skorupski in rejecting pragmatism. But the version of epistemicism he
mentions on p.54 and again on p.480 is not a view on which evaluative and practical rea-
sons are reduced to epistemic reasons, but rather one on which the former are analyzed in
terms of yet other normative notions.
Notably, Skorupski does not rule out a version of epistemicism inspired by Kearns
and Star (2009) on which reasons are evidence.5 Of course, Kearns and Star do appeal to
ought, so their full view may call RFP into question. But one could construct a variant on
their view that makes no explicit appeal to robustly normative notions. Consider a view
on which a consideration X is a reason for a response R in circumstances C iff X is an
epistemic reason to believe that R-ing would meet its constitutive aim in C (e.g., truth in
the case of belief). To be sure, particular constitutive aims might coincide with something
robustly normative—perhaps desire aims at the good—but the general characterization of
reasons can be neutral here, leaving this as a substantive issue. Perhaps Skorupski doesn’t
4For more on this suggestion, see Sylvan and Sosa (forthcoming).
5In Chapter 9, Skorupski claims that “[e]vidence involves the notion of inference, and in particular, a
posteriori inference” (211). So if there are non-inferential epistemic reasons, we would have to deny that
all reasons are evidence. But it is a familiar point from Conee and Feldman (2004, 2008) that “evidence”
can be understood in a wider way, allowing non-inferential reasons to be evidence.
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take this view to be inconsistent with his trichotomy thesis. If so, however, he understates
the case for unifying the reason-relations. For on this view, epistemic reasons are in a
clear way the fundamental kind.
5 Conclusion
A satisfactory defense of RFP would not only show us that we can analyze all normativity
purely in terms of reasons, but also explain why we should prefer such analyses to sim-
ilarly economical analyses in terms of other normative notions (e.g., goodness). There
might, after all, be many equally parsimonious ways of analyzing normativity, as the cot-
tage industry of X-first accounts of normativity strongly suggests. Skorupski is attuned to
this concern in the Introduction, and a big-picture reason for preferring RFP there is “the
underlying, stage-setting thought that. . . ‘normativity’ can be nothing more than a way of
talking about that by which self-determining—reasons-sensitive—agents steer” (4–5).
I think this is precisely the kind of deeper rationale for which defenders of RFP should
be searching. Skorupski’s defense of RFP is extremely refreshing in being structured
around such a rationale; to try to determine what the sole fundamental constituents of the
normative are in the absence of a broader meta-normative program is a vain task. But if
Skorupski’s rationale succeeds, I suspect that it is only because it meshes with and indeed
falls out of a Kantian constructivist metaphysics. For the central upshot of this discussion
is that we ought either to pursue constructivism or deny spontaneity any fundamental role
in our meta-normative outlook, opting for the modest intuitionism mentioned earlier.
If the Critical project is to leave “common cognition” intact, we might be forced to
pursue the latter option, since it is unclear whether there is an extensionally adequate
Kantian constructivism—though Kantian constructivism probably fares better than other
constructivisms on this score. But the most distinctive aspect of Skorupski’s project,
what sets it starkly apart from the work of other reasons-firsters, is its Kantian flavor. To
motivate and better preserve the distinctiveness of his version of RFP, I would encourage
Skorupski to become more Kantian and accept the cognition-dependence of normativity
suggested by cognitive internalism and the alleged role of spontaneity.
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